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CHALLENGING STATUTORY 
ACCOMMODATIONS FOR RELIGIOUSLY 
AFFILIATED DAYCARES:  AN APPLICATION OF 
THE THIRD-PARTY-HARM DOCTRINE 
Bronwyn Roantree* 
 
Daycare facilities are subject to a host of regulations that govern matters 
from basic health and safety requirements, to caregiver training, to maximum 
caregiver-to-child ratios.  In sixteen states, however, legislation exempts 
religiously affiliated daycares from many of these regulations, with six states 
extending particularly broad exemptions.  Supporters of the exemptions have 
justified them on constitutional grounds, arguing that state oversight of 
religiously affiliated daycares violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment.  Recent reporting has revealed that though children have been 
seriously injured or have died while in the care of religiously affiliated 
daycares exempted from regulations, challenges to the exemptions have been 
unsuccessful. 
This Note proposes an alternative strategy for challenging the statutory 
accommodations extended to religiously affiliated daycares.  Both judicial 
exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause and statutory accommodations 
under the Establishment Clause have historically been limited by the doctrine 
of harm to third parties.  Invoking a balancing test, this Note argues that 
courts ought to weigh the free exercise burden imposed on the religiously 
affiliated daycare against the harm to third parties caused by 
accommodation.  As such, this Note suggests that parents of children harmed 
in exempt facilities invoke the balancing test to argue that the harm to third 
parties outweighs the free exercise burden imposed by regulations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, one-year-old Carlos Cardenas wandered away from his caregivers 
at Praise Fellowship Assembly of God in Indianapolis, Indiana, where four 
staff members supervised over fifty children, and drowned in the church’s 
baptismal font.1  In 2010, seven-week-old Dylan Cummings was placed 
 
 1. Amy Julia Harris, Religious Day Cares Get Freedom from Oversight, with Tragic 
Results, REVEAL (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.revealnews.org/article/religious-day-cares-
operate-with-little-oversight-and-accountability [https://perma.cc/39PH-V6MP].  A recent 
story by the Center for Investigative Reporting uncovered dozens of similar incidents in 
religiously affiliated childcare centers across the country:  from infants being left in dirty 
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facedown on a mattress covered with a loose-fitting sheet in an electrical 
storeroom at Bethel Temple Church of Deliverance daycare in Norfolk, 
Virginia, and was discovered two hours later, dead, the sheet covered in 
vomit and blood.2  Indiana and Virginia are among sixteen states that exempt 
religiously affiliated childcare centers from state licensing requirements and 
regulations.3  The scope of the statutory accommodations varies from the 
minor (waiving registration fees) to the major (excusing facilities from nearly 
all regulations and oversight requirements, including requirements that 
workers know CPR, refrain from corporal punishment, and maintain a 
maximum ratio of children to caregivers).4  These statutory accommodations 
not only free religiously affiliated daycares from state regulations but also, 
when tragedies do occur, leave parents with little legal recourse:  in the 
absence of regulations, no rules have been broken.5 
Though the statutory accommodations have been challenged by secular 
daycare facilities, these challenges have never been successful for two 
reasons.6   First, courts have found that the statutes are consistent with the 
Establishment Clause under the test developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman7 and 
known as the Lemon test.  Second, courts have rejected the secular daycares’  
argument that the economic advantage that accrues to religious daycares as a 
result of their freedom from regulatory requirements is sufficient to establish 
standing.8  This Note proposes an alternative approach for challenging 
statutory accommodations afforded to religiously affiliated daycares:  
drawing on the recently reinvigorated idea of third-party harm, this Note 
argues that courts ought to balance the free exercise burden imposed on the 
daycare against the harm to third parties caused by accommodation. 
 
diapers for so long that they developed sores on their bottoms, to children being whipped and 
paddled to the extent that they developed bruises and welts. See id. 
 2. Id. 
 3. The six states that grant the broadest exemptions are Alabama, Florida, Indiana, 
Missouri, North Carolina, and Virginia. See ALA. CODE § 38-7 (2017); FLA. STAT. §§ 402.301–
402.319 (2017); IND. CODE  12-17.2-6-1 (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.211 (2016); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 110-106 (2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1716 (2017).  States with narrower 
exemptions include Arkansas and Illinois. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-78-209(b)(4) (2017); 225 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2.09 (2015). 
 4. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-7-3 (“[T]he provisions of this chapter shall not apply to 
preschool programs which are an integral part of a local church ministry or a religious 
nonprofit elementary school . . . .”); FLA. STAT. § 402.316 (“The provisions of ss. 402.301–
402.319, except for the requirements regarding screening of child care personnel, shall not 
apply to a child care facility which is an integral part of church or parochial schools . . . .”). 
 5. In several cases, daycare workers were charged with child neglect and homicide in 
connection with the deaths of children in their care.  For example, in Commonwealth v. Futrell, 
No. CR11-0211, 2012 WL 8261797, at *1–2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011), a child died of 
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) in a crib that was not sleep safe.  The judge dismissed 
the homicide charges, however, noting that “[t]he Commonwealth quite accurately argued that 
had Little Eagles Day Care been subject to the regulation and inspection required of secular 
day care centers, many of the SIDS risk factors would not have been present.” Id. at *7. 
 6. Though tort actions are likely available, they have not been widely brought.  The 
advantages and disadvantages of bringing such actions are beyond the scope of this Note.  
 7. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 8. Forest Hills Early Learning Ctr., Inc. v. Grace Baptist Church, 846 F.2d 260, 264 (4th 
Cir. 1988); Forte v. Coler, 725 F. Supp. 488, 491 (M.D. Fla. 1989). 
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Part I describes the development of judicial exemptions under the Free 
Exercise Clause and of statutory accommodations under the Establishment 
Clause.  Though these two regimes were developed in response to different 
clauses, they are deeply imbricated such that an understanding of one is 
impossible without an understanding of the other.  Part I.A examines the rise 
and fall of judicial exemptions developed under the Free Exercise Clause in 
a line of cases starting with Reynolds v. United States,9 through Employment 
Division v. Smith,10 and culminating in the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act11 (RFRA) and its state cousins.  Part I.B turns to the statutory 
accommodation regime developed under the Establishment Clause and 
examines two principal tests for evaluating claims under the Establishment 
Clause:  the Lemon12 test and the Texas Monthly13 test. 
Part II takes up the doctrine of harm to third parties as a tool for challenging 
the statutory accommodations granted to religiously affiliated daycares.  Part 
II.A considers the development of the doctrine of third-party harm in the 
context of religious freedom, and Part II.B considers the invocation of the 
third-party-harm doctrine in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.14 
Part III examines the statutes freeing religiously affiliated daycares from 
state regulations in the framework of statutory accommodations and judicial 
exemptions developed in Part I and explores how these accommodations 
have fared in the courts when they have been challenged by secular daycares. 
Finally, Part IV evaluates the opportunities and challenges the doctrine of 
third-party harm poses for advocates seeking to limit statutory 
accommodations for religiously affiliated daycares. 
I.  FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE IN CONVERSATION:  
JUDICIAL EXEMPTIONS AND STATUTORY ACCOMMODATIONS 
While the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause protect 
different rights, these rights are closely connected, leading to significant 
overlap in their interpretation and application.  Broadly speaking, the 
organizing principle of free exercise jurisprudence is that of 
 
 9. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).  The Court denied a Mormon man engaged in plural marriage an 
exemption from the law against bigamy. Id. at 167. 
 10. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  The Court denied adherents of the Native American Church 
who used peyote as part of a religious ritual an exemption from the Controlled Substances Act.  
Id. at 890. 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997). 
 12. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.  The three-pronged test asks (1) whether the statute has a 
secular legislative purpose, (2) whether the statute’s primary effect is to inhibit or advance 
religion, and (3) whether the statute results in excessive government entanglement with 
religion. Id. 
 13. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1989).  This two-step test builds on 
Lemon, asking first whether the law in question confers a benefit only on religious 
organizations and, if so, proceeding to two questions:  (1) whether the benefit can be justified 
as lifting a preexisting government-imposed burden on free exercise and (2) whether the 
benefit imposes significant burdens on third parties. Id. 
 14. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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antidiscrimination,15 with the question of judicial exemptions dominating the 
case law.  Under a judicial-exemptions regime, religious individuals or 
organizations bring suit alleging that a neutral law of general applicability 
disproportionately affects religious persons.16  The organizing principle of a 
significant portion of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, by contrast, is that 
of statutory accommodation.17  Under a statutory-accommodation regime, 
the legislature enacts a law that confers some benefit on religious persons or 
organizations, often by freeing them from some regulation or tax.18  
Distinguishing judicial exemptions from statutory accommodations—and 
thus Free Exercise Clause claims from Establishment Clause claims—is 
more difficult in practice than this schema might lead one to believe.  This is 
particularly evident in the imprecision of the language used to discuss the two 
Clauses:  statutory accommodations, for instance, are often referred to as 
exemptions, which leads to analytical confusion.  Thus, while this Note 
focuses on statutory accommodations granted to religiously affiliated 
daycares, it is necessary to consider the history and development of both 
judicial exemptions and statutory accommodations. 
A.  The Rise and Fall of Judicial Exemptions:  
From Reynolds to Smith 
Exemptions for religious persons and institutions from generally 
applicable laws under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause emerged 
only in the 1960s, and its brief history has been a tumultuous one.  Prior to 
the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court forcefully rejected the concept of 
exemptions on free exercise grounds.  Indeed, in Reynolds, the Court’s first 
engagement with the Free Exercise Clause, the Court famously found that to 
permit exemptions from generally applicable laws on the grounds of religious 
belief “would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior 
to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law 
unto himself.  Government could exist only in name under such 
circumstances.”19  From 1878 until the 1960s, the rejection of exemptions 
purely on free exercise grounds remained firmly in place.  On those rare 
occasions that religious claimants prevailed at the Court, they did so by 
 
 15. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) 
(“At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue 
discriminates against some or all religious belief or regulates or prohibits conduct because it 
is undertaken for religious reasons.”). 
 16. See generally Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (1994). 
 17. A separate element of Establishment Clause jurisprudence pushes back against the 
dominant religion’s use of power by limiting prayer in schools, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 
424–25 (1962), financial assistance to religious bodies, Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602, and the 
display of religious symbols, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 704–05 (1984). 
 18. See Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion 
(Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1708–09 (1988). 
 19. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878). 
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pairing their free exercise claim with another right, such as freedom of 
speech.20 
Tracing the path of judicial exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause, 
Part I.A.1 describes their emergence in the 1960s and 1970s as articulated in 
Sherbert v. Verner.21  Part I.A.2 describes the Court’s radical narrowing of 
judicial exemptions, in form if not in function, in the 1990 Smith decision.  
Congress’s response to Smith, RFRA, is examined in Part I.A.2.a, while Part 
I.A.2.b considers the Court’s response to RFRA in City of Boerne v. Flores22 
and Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal.23  Finally, 
Part I.A.2.c takes up state analogues to RFRA. 
1.  The Inauguration of Exemptions:  
Sherbert and Yoder 
Starting in the 1960s, the Warren Court’s liberal majority inaugurated a 
new era in free exercise jurisprudence, rejecting the Court’s reasoning in 
Reynolds and embracing exemptions as a way to preserve religious liberty in 
an increasingly pluralistic society.  The Court announced exemptions on free 
exercise grounds in its 1963 decision in Sherbert, in which the Court held 
that denying a woman unemployment benefits because her religious beliefs 
prevented her from working on Saturday violated her constitutional right to 
the free exercise of religion.24  Scholars have since argued that Sherbert and 
two related cases25 constitute a special and discrete set of cases limited to 
unemployment benefits.26  Even if one accepts that Sherbert is so limited, the 
three-prong test for evaluating free exercise claims introduced in Sherbert 
nevertheless laid the groundwork for the seminal judicial exemptions case, 
Wisconsin v. Yoder.27 
Briefly, the three-prong test runs as follows:  First, the court asks whether 
the government’s actions burden a person’s free exercise of religion.28  This 
 
 20. Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35, 49 (2015) (noting that the Court tended to grant exemptions where 
the due process rights of parents to direct their child’s upbringing were burdened, as in Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–402 (1923), or free speech rights were infringed, as in West 
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634–35 & n.15 (1943)). 
 21. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  The Court held that a law denying unemployment compensation 
to a person fired because her job requirements conflicted with her religious beliefs violated 
the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 406. 
 22. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 23. 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 24. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410. 
 25. See generally Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Cmm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); 
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
 26. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of 
Conscience:  The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1245, 1254 (1994); Lupu, supra note 20, at 49; see also Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
883 (1990) (noting that the Sherbert test has been cabined to claims about unemployment 
compensation.). 
 27. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).  The Court granted Amish parents who sought, for religious 
reasons, to withdraw their children from school after eighth grade, an exemption from a 
Wisconsin law requiring children to attend school until age sixteen. Id. at 235–36. 
 28. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. 
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burden must be substantial:  a trivial burden would not survive this prong.29  
If the first prong is met, the state must then meet the second and third prongs.  
The second prong asks whether the state has a compelling interest generally 
in the law at issue.30  Finally, under the third prong, the burden must be 
narrowly tailored; that is, there must be no alternative regulation that would 
both achieve the state’s interest and avoid infringing on free exercise.31  Thus, 
under the third prong, the state must demonstrate that it truly requires uniform 
adherence to the law in question.  If the claimant satisfies the first prong, and 
the state fails to satisfy the second and third prongs, then the individual is 
entitled to an exemption from the otherwise generally applicable law at 
issue.32  Thus, though the Sherbert test arguably would come to be confined 
to unemployment cases, at the time it was decided, it signaled a radical new 
openness to exemptions on free exercise grounds. 
The Court’s new approach to exemptions on free exercise grounds is 
exemplified in Yoder, in what some have characterized as the first—and 
perhaps only—true exemption case in which the claimant prevailed.33  In 
Yoder, Amish parents sought to withdraw their children from school after 
eighth grade though state law required attendance in public or private school 
until age sixteen.34  Applying the three-prong Sherbert test, the Court held 
that the Amish were entitled to an exemption from the generally applicable 
law on free exercise grounds.  First, the Court found that compelling Amish 
children to remain in school past eighth grade constituted a burden on the 
respondents’ religious practices that was “not only severe, but 
inescapable.”35  Second, the Court determined that the state lacked a 
compelling interest for imposing said burden.36  With the state having failed 
the second prong, the Court did not discuss the third prong—whether the law 
in question was narrowly tailored.  Framed in the terminology of the Sherbert 
test, the Yoder decision resembled a simple balancing test, with the interests 
of the Amish parents in perpetuating the community weighed against the 
state’s dual interests in ensuring uniform adherence to the law and in 
producing an educated citizenry.37  Curiously, the question of exactly whose 
interests—the parents’ or the children’s—were properly considered in the 
balancing test was addressed only cursorily.  In his dissent, Justice William 
 
 29. Id. at 406. 
 30. Id. at 407 (noting that the state’s professed fear of “unscrupulous claimants feigning 
religious objections” is not a sufficiently compelling interest). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Lupu argues that Sherbert is not properly read as an exemptions case because the 
appellant was not technically exempted from anything.  Rather, he argues, “Sherbert is a 
decision about a constitutionally mandatory extension of benefits, rather than an exemption 
from general norms.” Lupu, supra note 20, at 50. 
 33. Id. (“Wisconsin v. Yoder . . . is the true and only lynchpin of a doctrine of free exercise 
exemptions.”).   
 34. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972). 
 35. Id. at 218. 
 36. See id. at 222 (noting that although the state has an interest in producing educated and 
engaged citizens, there is no evidence that the two additional years of schooling the state seeks 
to impose is necessary to achieve this interest). 
 37. See Lupu, supra note 20, at 50–51. 
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Douglas argued powerfully that the interests of the children ought also to be 
considered.38  Though it is the parents who suffer the legal consequences of 
keeping their children out of school, it is the children who suffer the social 
and academic consequences of leaving school before the age of sixteen.  
Douglas thus argued that the case should be remanded and that each of the 
affected students be canvassed.39  Douglas’s dissent illustrates that the 
impulse to weigh third-party harms in the balance when evaluating judicial 
exemption cases arose quite early in the life of the exemption regime. 
After a strong initial showing in the 1960s through the 1970s, the 
exemptions regime suffered setbacks in a trio of cases in the 1980s.40  The 
balancing language of Yoder was invoked in United States v. Lee,41 in which 
the Court held that the interest of the state in maintaining a uniform social 
security system outweighed the harms the social security program, anathema 
to Amish religion, imposed on the Amish plaintiffs.42  Though it was 
“sensitive to the needs flowing from the Free Exercise Clause,” the Court 
held that “every person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to 
exercising every aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs.”43  Further 
challenges followed, but the judicial exemptions regime hobbled along until, 
in 1990, it was dealt a mortal blow in Employment Division v. Smith.44 
2.  The Narrowing of Judicial Exemptions:  
Smith and Its Progeny 
In a deeply controversial decision, the Court rejected the exemption regime 
in language lifted straight from Reynolds.45  In Smith, two individuals were 
denied unemployment benefits after they were dismissed from their jobs 
because they had ingested peyote.46  The claimants, who were active 
members of the Native American Church, ingested the peyote as part of a 
religious ritual and asserted that the general prohibition on peyote under 
Oregon’s controlled substance law violated the Free Exercise Clause when 
 
 38. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[N]o analysis of religious-
liberty claims can take place in a vacuum.  If the parents in this case are allowed a religious 
exemption, the inevitable effect is to impose the parents’ notions of religious duty upon their 
children.”). 
 39. Id. at 246 & n.4 (“Canvassing the views of all school-age Amish children in the State 
of Wisconsin would not present insurmountable difficulties.  A 1968 survey indicated that 
there were at that time only 256 such children in the entire State.” (citing Norman R. Prance, 
Comment, The Amish and Compulsory Schools Attendance:  Recent Developments, 1971 WIS. 
L. REV. 832, 852 n.132)). 
 40. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700 (1986) (holding that the requirement that an 
individual have a social security number in order to obtain government benefits did not violate 
free exercise); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986) (holding that Air Force 
regulations mandating the removal of headgear indoors, including yarmulkes, did not violate 
free exercise); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982) (holding that religious 
employers are not exempt from paying social security tax). 
 41. 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
 42. Id. at 258. 
 43. Id. at 261. 
 44. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 45. Id. at 890. 
 46. Id. at 874. 
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applied to the sacramental use of peyote.47  The Court roundly rejected this 
claim and observed that the balancing test developed in Sherbert had never 
been used to grant an exemption from a generally applicable criminal law.48  
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, noted that “[t]o make an 
individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law’s 
coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest is 
‘compelling’—permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, ‘to become a law unto 
himself,’—contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.”49  
Indeed, the majority observed that anarchy could result from applying a 
compelling government interest standard in free exercise cases.50 
a.  Congress Responds to Smith:  
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
This full-throated evisceration of judicial exemptions on free exercise 
grounds was met with sustained public outcry, and Congress’s response to 
the public uproar over Smith was swift and decisive.51  In 1993, a unanimous 
House of Representatives and a nearly unanimous Senate passed RFRA.52  In 
a statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Ted Kennedy, 
who introduced the bill along with twenty-three other Senators, characterized 
RFRA as simply restoring the “compelling government interest” requirement 
for evaluating free exercise claims using pre-Smith standards.53  Indeed, the 
purposes of RFRA are enumerated as follows: 
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to 
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is 
substantially burdened; and 
 
 47. Id. at 876. 
 48. Id. at 882–83.  This does not capture Yoder, however, which cannot be understood as 
a hybrid rights case. 
 49. Id. at 885 (citation omitted) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 
(1879)). 
 50. Id. at 888 (“Any society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy, but that 
danger increases in direct proportion to the society’s diversity of religious beliefs, and its 
determination to coerce or suppress none of them.”). 
 51. Condemnation of the Smith decision crossed ideological and political lines, and RFRA 
was supported by a coalition of unlikely bedfellows, including the National Association of 
Evangelicals, the American Civil Liberties Union, and People for the American Way. See 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993:  Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 2 (1993) (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy). 
 52. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, 
invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 53. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993:  Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 51, at 2 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) (“In 
essence, the act codifies the requirement for the Government to demonstrate that any law 
burdening the free exercise of religion is essential to furthering a compelling governmental 
interest and is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.”). 
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(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is 
substantially burdened by government.54 
RFRA thus straddles the divide between judicial exemptions and 
legislative accommodations; operating as a legislative accommodation 
intended to restore the jurisprudence of judicial exemption.  In practice, 
RFRA authorizes judges to apply strict scrutiny and to determine whether a 
neutral law of general applicability has imposed a substantial burden.  In 
other words, RFRA instructs courts to continue their pre-Smith practices but 
to do so as a matter of statutory, rather than constitutional, interpretation.55  
Though the likely impact of RFRA in its 1993 form on free exercise 
jurisprudence is debatable,56 its decisive passage and overwhelming public 
support signaled a popular openness to judicial exemptions.  The Court’s 
schizophrenic response to RFRA, however, underscored a profound 
uncertainty on the Supreme Court regarding judicial exemptions. 
b.  The Court Responds to RFRA:  
Boerne and O Centro 
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Archbishop of San Antonio sought an 
exemption under RFRA from city zoning laws.57  The Court held that RFRA 
exceeded Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and so was unconstitutional.58  Indeed, the Court concluded that 
RFRA’s “[s]weeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of 
government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every 
description and regardless of subject matter.”59  Congress lacks the power to 
 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (2012), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997). 
 55. Curiously, among the most vocal opponents of RFRA were prolife groups, who feared 
women would use RFRA to advocate for a religious right to an abortion.  Though their fear 
never materialized, this underscores the complexity and bipartisanship of the third-party-harm 
doctrine in the free exercise jurisprudence. See Robert F. Drinan & Jennifer I. Huffman, The 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act:  A Legislative History, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 531, 534 
(1993). 
 56. Heated scholarly debate arose over whether Congress intended a return to the robust 
exemption regime of Sherbert and Yoder that dominated the 1960s and 1970s, or the weakened 
exemption regime of the 1980s exemplified in Lee, Bowen, and Goldman. See, e.g., 
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 445–47 (1994); Lupu, supra note 20, at 54–55; 
see also Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 591 (1998) 
(observing that RFRA litigation, particularly outside of the prison context, was largely 
unsuccessful). 
 57. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  Local zoning authorities denied the Archbishop of San Antonio 
a building permit to enlarge a church under an historic preservation ordinance. Id. at 512. 
 58. See id. at 536.  Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
limited to enforcing the provisions of the Amendment.  The Court found that the Enforcement 
Clause is remedial, rather than substantive, such that RFRA, which altered the meaning of the 
Free Exercise Clause and imposed this reading on the states, exceeded Congress’s powers 
under the Enforcement Clause. See id. at 519 (“Congress does not enforce a constitutional 
right by changing what the right is.  It has been given the power ‘to enforce’, not the power to 
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.”). 
 59. Id. at 532. 
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change or determine the scope of constitutional protections, but, with RFRA, 
Congress changed the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.60  Indeed, 
Congress not only overstepped its Section 5 power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment but also intruded into the proper domain of the judiciary, 
rendering RFRA unconstitutional as applied to states.61  Nearly ten years 
after the Court had severely hobbled RFRA as it applied to the states, it 
affirmed RFRA as it applied to the federal government.62  In O Centro, the 
Court upheld a preliminary injunction granting a religious group an 
exemption from the Controlled Substances Act in order to import hoasca, a 
hallucinogenic drug used in the group’s religious rituals.63  Applying the 
compelling-interest test detailed in the statute, the Court found that the 
government failed to show that hoasca was dangerous to human health and 
that importation by the group posed a risk of drug trafficking.64  Although 
the Court maintained that RFRA could not require the Court to adopt the 
Sherbert test, it supported RFRA’s commitment to a balancing approach.65  
The heavy burden of persuasion that the Court identified points to a 
reinvigoration of strict scrutiny as applied to the actions of the federal 
government.  That the decision was unanimous is a strong signal that, by 
2006, the Court was once again open to statutory accommodations on free 
exercise grounds. 
c.  RFRA at the State Level 
With RFRA gutted at the federal level, a number of states responded by 
passing their own versions of RFRA (“state RFRAs”).66  All states protect 
religious freedom in some way, and the vast majority of state constitutions 
contain both free exercise and establishment provisions.67  The language of 
these provisions, though, differs across states and differs from the language 
of the First Amendment.  Many state constitutions, for instance, contain 
superstrong establishment clauses that go beyond the federal Establishment 
Clause and are primarily directed at limiting financial aid to sectarian 
 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 536 (“RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of 
powers and the federal balance.”). 
 62. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439 
(2006). 
 63. Id. at 425. 
 64. Id. at 432–33. 
 65. Id. at 439 (“Congress has determined that courts should strike sensible balances, 
pursuant to a compelling interest test that requires the Government to address the particular 
practice at issue.”). 
 66. As of 2016, twenty-one states had enacted RFRA through legislation:  Alabama, 
Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Alan E. Brownstein, State RFRA Statutes and 
Freedom of Speech, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605, 607 n.4 (1999). 
 67. See generally Monrad G. Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First 
Amendment Freedoms, 4 VAND. L. REV. 620 (1951) (surveying religious freedom protections 
in state constitutions). 
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schools.68  While the language of free exercise clauses in state constitutions 
differs from that of the U.S. Constitution, state courts have generally 
followed the Supreme Court’s lead in interpreting their own free exercise 
clauses.69  On the heels of the public outcry over Smith and Boerne, however, 
many state legislatures followed Congress’s lead and passed state RFRAs, 
often as constitutional amendments.  In an additional ten states, RFRA-like 
provisions have become law through state court decisions.70  Where state 
RFRAs have been enacted through legislation, the language often draws 
verbatim from RFRA.  Consider, for instance, Virginia’s legislation: 
No government entity shall substantially burden a person’s free exercise of 
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability unless 
it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is (i) essential 
to further a compelling governmental interest and (ii) the least restrictive 
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.71 
Despite the rush to pass state RFRAs, many have languished largely 
unused and unchallenged for twenty years.72  As the free exercise landscape 
 
 68. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art 1, § 7 (“[N]o money shall ever be taken from the public 
treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid 
of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and . . . no preference shall be 
given to nor any discrimination made against any church, sect or creed of religion, or any form 
of religious faith or worship.”). 
 69. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art I, § 3 (“[T]he civil rights, privileges, and capacities of any 
citizen shall not be in any manner affected by his religious principles.”); N.D. CONST. art. I, 
§ 3 (“The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without 
discrimination or preference shall be forever guaranteed in this state . . . but the liberty of 
conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or 
justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state.”); VA. CONST. art I, § 16 
(“[A]ll men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of 
conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and 
charity towards each other.”). 
 70. States with RFRA-like provisions enacted through judicial decisions include Alaska, 
Hawaii, Ohio, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Washington, and 
Wisconsin. Juliet Eilperin, 31 States Have Heightened Religious Freedom Protections, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 1, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/03/01/where-
in-the-u-s-are-there-heightened-protections-for-religious-freedom [https://perma.cc/GFV9-
V7AT]. 
 71. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-2.02(B) (2017).  The Virginia Code goes on to address the 
complex relationship between judicial exemptions and both the U.S. Establishment Clause and 
the state establishment clause: 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to (i) authorize any government entity to 
burden any religious belief or (ii) affect, interpret or in any way address those 
portions of Article 1, Section 16 of the Constitution of Virginia, the Virginia Act for 
Religious Freedom (§ 57-1 et seq.), and the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution that prohibit laws respecting the establishment of religion.  Granting 
government funds, benefits or exemptions, to the extent permissible under clause 
(ii) of this subsection, shall not constitute a violation of this section.  As used in this 
subsection, “granting” used with respect to government funding, benefits, or 
exemptions shall not include the denial of government funding, benefits, or 
exemptions. 
Id. 
 72. Where state RFRAs have been decisive, state courts followed the federal courts’ lead 
in interpretation. See, e.g., Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63, 65–66 (Me. 1992) (finding 
that confiscation of a marijuana pipe did not violate free exercise, even though the pipe’s 
owner used marijuana for religious purposes); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 236 
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shifts once again in the aftermath of Hobby Lobby, state RFRAs present an 
opportunity to revitalize the balancing test of the earliest free exercise 
judicial-exemption cases, particularly if read in tandem with recent 
developments in Establishment Clause statutory accommodations.73 
B.  Statutory Accommodations and the Establishment Clause 
While Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence involves judicial exemptions, 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is centered on legislative 
accommodations.  Though both create carve-outs from neutral laws of 
general applicability, exemptions are ordered by the judiciary by virtue of the 
Free Exercise Clause, while accommodations are written into the law by 
legislative discretion. 
Whether and how accommodation can be distinguished from 
establishment is hotly contested.  Advocates for statutory accommodation 
argue that the distinction is straightforward and turns on whether the statute 
in question promotes a favored form of religion or allows religious 
individuals the free exercise of religion.74  Opponents of statutory 
accommodation, by contrast, argue that any accommodation of religion is 
tantamount to the establishment of religion.  Indeed, as a reflection of 
Enlightenment values, the Establishment Clause is suspicious—and not 
protective—of religion.75   
The following sections examine the development of legislative 
accommodations and the relationship between such accommodations and 
judicial exemptions, starting with an examination of the Lemon test in Part 
I.B.1 before moving to an analysis of the Texas Monthly test in Part I.B.2.  
Finally, Part I.B.3 takes up the special place of ministerial exceptions under 
 
(Mass. 1994) (reversing and remanding a lower court decision that rejected a landlord’s claim 
that renting to unmarried couples violated his free exercise); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 
393, 396 (Minn. 1990) (denying Amish plaintiffs an exemption from generally applicable 
traffic laws sought on religious freedom grounds); Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 
(Ohio 2000) (denying a Native American correctional officer an exemption from the grooming 
police of the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction sought on free exercise grounds); 
First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 185 (Wash. 1992) (finding 
that city landmarks ordinances restricting a church’s ability to alter its exterior violated the 
First Amendment). 
 73. See generally Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance:  Religious Liberty and Third-Party 
Harms, 84 MINN. L. REV. 589 (2000); Lupu, supra note 20; Toni M. Massaro, Nuts and Seeds:  
Mitigating Third-Party Harms of Religious Exemptions, Post-Hobby Lobby, 92 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 325 (2015); Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Marriage Equality Statutes, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 25 (2015). 
 74. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion:  An Update and a Response to 
the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 688 (1992) (“The hallmark of accommodation is that 
the individual or group decides for itself whether to engage in a religious practice, or what 
practice to engage in, on grounds independent of the governmental action. . . .  The hallmark 
of establishment is that the government uses its authority and resources to support one religion 
over another, or religion over nonreligion.”). 
 75. Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?:  Reconsidering the Accommodation of 
Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 185 
(1990) (“[A]id to religion in all its forms is fundamentally inconsistent with the secular nature 
of democratic principles embodied in the Constitution.”). 
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the Establishment Clause by looking at two central cases:  Corp. of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos76 and Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. 
EEOC.77 
1.  The Lemon Test and the Entanglement Prong 
As we have seen, the development of judicial exemptions has been marked 
by false starts and doctrinal shifts.  The development of statutory 
accommodations under the Establishment Clause has been no different.  
Though the Lemon test has been challenged repeatedly, it remains the 
touchstone for assessing the constitutionality of statutory accommodations 
under the Establishment Clause.  In Lemon, state monies were paid to 
religiously affiliated schools to supplement the salaries of teachers of secular 
subjects.78  The Court held that the state aid violated the Establishment 
Clause, concluding that “[t]he Constitution decrees that religion must be a 
private matter . . . and that while some involvement and entanglement are 
inevitable, lines must be drawn.”79  The Court set out a three-pronged test for 
determining where these lines should be drawn.  First, the statute must have 
a secular legislative purpose; second, the statute’s primary effect must not 
advance or inhibit the practice of religion;80 and third, the statute must not 
result in excessive government entanglement with religion.81  Of these three, 
the entanglement prong raises particularly difficult interpretive questions, 
especially with regard to statutory accommodations for religiously affiliated 
daycares. 
The Court opened its analysis of the entanglement prong by 
acknowledging that total separation of church and state is neither practical 
nor desirable.82  Nor is it possible to construct a precise set of rules for 
determining whether a statute creates excessive entanglement.83  Rather, a 
more nuanced approach is required, one that examines the “character and 
purposes of the institutions that are benefitted, the nature of the aid that the 
State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and 
 
 76. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 77. 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
 78. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607–10 (1971). 
 79. Id. at 625. 
 80. A key primary-effects case is Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 474 U.S. 703, 710-
711 (1985).  There, the Court found that a Connecticut statute that extended to Sabbath 
observers an “absolute and unqualified right” not to work on the Sabbath impermissibly 
advanced religion, citing Judge Learned Hand’s observation in Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. 
Co., 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953), that “[t]he First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to 
insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his own 
religious necessities,” id. at 61. 
 81. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13.  The Court imports the entanglement prong from Walz v. 
Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).  Excessive entanglement is characterized by 
“comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance of religion.” Vernon v. City 
of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1399 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 82. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 (noting that fire inspections and building and zoning 
regulations are examples of “necessary and permissible contacts”). 
 83. Id. 
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the religious authority.”84  In Lemon, the Court found that the schools in 
question were of a substantial religious character.85  Indeed, recognition of 
this led the state to implement careful government controls and oversight of 
the aid to ensure that the funds were used only to support secular purposes.86  
The monitoring needed to guard against the use of funds to support the 
religious mission of the schools, however, resulted in the unacceptable 
entanglement of church and state.87  In addition to requiring the direct 
intervention of the state into the affairs of a religious institution, the Court 
worried that state aid to religious schools would be dangerously divisive.88 
While the application of the Lemon test has shifted since it was established 
in 1971, the contours of the entanglement prong have remained largely intact.  
Concerns about administrative entanglement, the type of entanglement at 
issue in Lemon, remain particularly prominent.  In Lemon, the test was used 
to invalidate state aid to religion, yet religious groups seeking statutory 
accommodations have also invoked excessive entanglement to argue for the 
right to be free of state oversight.89 
Statutory accommodations that restrict state inspection of the religious 
content of a religious organization do not extend, however, to all secular 
government activity.90  For example, courts have held that religious 
organizations must comply with fire inspections and building and zoning 
regulations,91 as well as record-keeping requirements.92  The excessive-
entanglement test, developed to address the issue of when, if ever, state funds 
may be used to support the secular activities of a religious group, raises as 
many questions as it answers.  As such, while the excessive-entanglement 
test stands as one of the chief interpretive approaches to the Establishment 
Clause, the Court has developed other approaches, principally the three-step 
framework in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock.93 
2.  The Texas Monthly Test:   
Free Exercise Burdens and Harm to Third Parties 
In Texas Monthly, the Court considered whether a statutory 
accommodation granted to religious groups violated the Establishment 
Clause.94  The Court struck down a Texas law that exempted religious 
 
 84. Id. at 615. 
 85. Id. at 616. 
 86. See id. at 619–20. 
 87. Id. at 619. 
 88. Id. at 622 (“[P]olitical division along religious lines was one of the principal evils 
against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.  The potential divisiveness of 
such conflict is a threat to the normal political process.”). 
 89. See Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
11–13, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 2014 WL 
356639, at *11–13. 
 90. See infra Part III.B. 
 91. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305 (1985). 
 92. Id. at 305–06. 
 93. 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 94. Id. at 5 (plurality opinion). 
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periodicals from paying sales tax as an “unjustifiable award[] of assistance to 
religious organizations” that “convey[s] a message of endorsement” to those 
excluded organizations.95  In its analysis, the Brennan plurality developed a 
three-step framework for determining whether a legislative accommodation 
is appropriate under the Establishment Clause.96  The threshold question is 
whether the benefits are available to a broad array of recipients, secular and 
religious alike.97  If the benefits flow exclusively to religious recipients, the 
threshold is met, and the Court moves to the second step, which consists of 
two prongs.98  In the first prong of the second step, the Court asks whether 
the benefits lift an obstacle imposed by the government on the free exercise 
of religion, while in the second prong, the Court asks whether the 
accommodation imposes harm on third parties.99 
As to the threshold question, while not every nonreligious group need 
benefit, enough nonreligious groups must benefit to demonstrate that the 
benefit is not targeted to religious groups.  Thus, a government program that 
is neutral in its offerings such that benefits do not flow exclusively, or nearly 
so, to religious institutions or persons may “withstand Establishment Clause 
scrutiny without further analysis.”100 
As to the first prong, if a benefit flows only to religious groups or persons, 
this benefit can be justified if it lifts a preexisting government-imposed free 
exercise burden.  The deep entanglement of free exercise jurisprudence and 
establishment jurisprudence is evident.  Indeed, it has been observed that the 
Court has not yet “flesh[ed] out the operational meaning of this principle,”101 
thereby sidestepping the interpretive difficulties that arise when the two 
Clauses appear to be at odds.  In these so-called mixed-effect cases, granting 
a legislative accommodation would alleviate a free exercise burden, but such 
an accommodation may also create establishment problems where it imposed 
significant harm on third parties.102 
As to the second prong, the Court asks after harms to third parties.  
Religion-only benefits granted through statutory accommodations may be 
appropriate only if they do not impose “substantial” burdens on third parties.  
The Court offers little guidance, however, for determining when a burden on 
 
 95. Id. at 15 (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O’Connor J., concurring)). 
 96. Id. (“[W]hen government directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organizations that 
is not required by the Free Exercise Clause and that either burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly 
or cannot reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free 
exercise of religion, . . . it ‘provide[s] unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious 
organizations’ and cannot but ‘conve[y] a message of endorsement to slighted members of the 
community.’” (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Amos, 483 U.S. at 348)). 
 97. Id. at 14. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 15–16. 
 100. See McConnell, supra note 74, at 699.  
 101. Id. at 700. 
 102. Consider, for example, the catch-22 posed by Sunday-closing laws.  Judicial 
exemptions from such laws lift a burden on Saturday Sabbatarians.  Because most stores are 
not operated by Saturday Sabbatarians, however, the exemption effectively imposes an 
economic cost on Sunday observers. See id. at 701–02. 
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a third party is so substantial that it would militate against an 
accommodation.103  Thus, while harm to third parties as a limiting factor on 
establishment claims is within the Texas Monthly framework, the contours of 
what constitutes a harm to third parties sufficient to defeat statutory 
accommodation remains largely unexplored.  It is not clear in the Brennan 
plurality whether the two prongs in step two are properly read as disjunctive 
(i.e., a religion-only benefit is appropriate if it lifts a free exercise burden or 
imposes significant harm on a third party) or as conjunctive (i.e., a religion-
only benefit is appropriate if it lifts a free exercise burden and also does not 
impose a significant harm on a third party). 
3.  Harm to Third Parties:   
The Ministerial Exception in Hosanna-Tabor and Amos 
Under the ministerial exception, some of the internal affairs of religious 
organizations may be exempt from generally applicable laws.104  Within 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the ministerial exception line of cases 
occupies the muddy middle ground between judicial exemptions under the 
Free Exercise Clause and legislative accommodations under the 
Establishment Clause.  Religious organizations arguing for a ministerial 
exception, then, do so from both Clauses:  to be free to practice their religion, 
there must be limits on state oversight of religious matters. 
Two justifications for the ministerial exemption are relevant to the 
question of statutory accommodations for religiously affiliated daycares:  (1) 
to protect religious rules of ministry that would otherwise be prohibited in a 
secular context and (2) to protect the right of religious organizations to 
evaluate its employees according to religious standards.105  As such, the 
ministerial exception is an explicit grant intended to benefit only religious 
organizations.  The complexity of the ministerial exception in action as a 
legislative accommodation is illustrated in a pair of cases:  Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC106 and Corp. of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos.107 
Hosanna-Tabor stands as the paradigmatic application of the ministerial 
exception.  At issue in Hosanna-Tabor was whether a teacher who had sought 
 
 103. Id. at 703–04.  McConnell argues that in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 
703 (1985), the Court implied that a burden was substantial when it was significantly 
disproportionate to the benefit that accrued to the religious person or group. McConnell, supra 
note 74, at 703–04.  In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), by contrast, 
the Court implied that even a de minimis burden on third parties triggered establishment 
concerns. McConnell, supra note 74, at 703–04. 
 104. Paul Horwitz, Act III of the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. L. REV. 973, 977–78 
(2012) (arguing that the ministerial exception emerged from the institutional separation of 
church and state that has been at the foundation of American civic thought since colonial 
times). 
 105. Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 839, 848–49 (2012). 
 106. 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
 107. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
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and received the designation of “called” teacher, meaning she understood 
herself as being called to her vocation by God, could be fired for violating 
the religious teachings of the Church.108  Upholding the Church’s right to fire 
the teacher, the Court held that the ministerial exception shielded the church-
operated school from liability under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA),109 which would otherwise have protected the interests of a school 
employee.110  Indeed, failing to grant the ministerial exception would violate 
both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.111 
The Court’s holding in Hosanna-Tabor was narrow, finding only that the 
ministerial exception precluded an employment discrimination suit brought 
by a minister.112  Evaluating the claim under the Texas Monthly test, 
however, would likely result in a similar outcome.  First, the benefit—
exemption from certain ADA provisions—would flow only to religious 
institutions.  Having met the threshold requirement of the first step, the 
analysis would then consider the two prongs of the second step. First, does 
this religion-only benefit lift a preexisting government-imposed free exercise 
burden?  The ministerial exception underscores the great deference shown to 
religious groups in the appointment of religious personnel.  As such, the 
church would likely prevail on this first prong of the second step. 
Considering how the accommodation might fare under the second prong 
of the Texas Monthly test is instructive.  The Court acknowledged that its 
ruling imposed harms on a third party—namely, the teacher who lost her 
job.113  Having done so, the Court laid out a three-part test for evaluating 
third-party harm:  (1) the magnitude of the harm imposed on the third party, 
(2) the likelihood of the harm occurring, and (3) the magnitude of the belief 
impacted.  In Hosanna-Tabor, the magnitude of the harm imposed on the 
third party was significant:  the teacher lost her job.  The likelihood of the 
harm occurring, or that other teachers would be fired for violating a religious 
stricture, was also high.  Further, it is unlikely that threatening to sue to 
enforce one’s civil rights constitutes legitimate grounds for dismissal.  
Finally, the magnitude of the impacted belief was also high, as it cut to the 
quick of the Church’s expectations of its ministers.  With all three elements 
of the Texas Monthly framework raising strong concerns, and two of the three 
elements militating against a statutory accommodation, the Court’s decision 
in Hosanna-Tabor thus underscores the arguably outsized weight given to 
 
 108. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 179–81.  The Lutheran Synod believes that Christians 
should resolve disputes internally. Id. at 180.  The teacher’s threat to sue the Church for firing 
her in violation of the ADA violated that belief. Id. at 204–05. 
 109. The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified individual on 
the basis of disability as well as from retaliating against an employee who charges her 
employer with violating the ADA. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12112(a), 12203(a) (2012). 
 110. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 179–80. 
 111. Id. at 188–89 (“By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free 
Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission 
through its appointments. . . .  [It] also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits 
government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.”). 
 112. Id. at 188. 
 113. Id. at 179, 196. 
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the ministerial exception.  Whether and to what extent proponents of statutory 
accommodations for religiously affiliated daycares can successfully argue 
that the accommodations fall under the ministerial exception, then, will likely 
have a significant outcome on a court’s decision if these accommodations are 
challenged. 
If Hosanna-Tabor represents a relatively straightforward application of the 
ministerial exception, Amos underscores the Court’s capacious 
understanding of the exception’s scope.  In Amos, a building engineer at a 
gymnasium owned and operated by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints (LDS) was fired when he failed to secure a certificate from the LDS 
authorities that he was a member in good standing.114  The employee sued, 
alleging religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.115  The Court rejected the employee’s argument, finding that § 702, 
which permits religious organizations to discriminate on religious grounds, 
applied to the secular nonprofit activities of said organizations.116  Thus, 
though Amos ostensibly addresses whether a statutory accommodation 
violates the Establishment Clause, judicial exemptions and the free exercise 
concerns they address also played an important role in the Court’s reasoning. 
Acknowledging the deep connection between the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses, the Court concluded that properly curtailing 
government interference in religious life disfavors not only positive statutory 
mandates to which a religious group must conform its practices but also 
statutes that would force a religious organization to defend its beliefs and 
practices before a judge who “would not understand its religious tenets and 
sense of mission,” as so doing places a “significant burden on a religious 
organization.”117  The wall of separation between church and state thus 
appears particularly impregnable, with religious organizations effectively 
shielded from having to defend practices forbidden to secular organizations. 
As an extension of the ministerial exception to employees whose 
ministerial function was tenuous at best, Amos underscores the complexity of 
the exception.118  For some, the ministerial exception is fundamental to 
protecting religious institutions from state dominance.119  Others endorse 
ministerial exceptions less because they fear state overreach in religious 
affairs and more because they are skeptical of the courts’ ability to properly 
distinguish religious from non-religious job functions.120  Still others argue 
 
 114. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987). 
 115. Id. at 331; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 116. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335–36. 
 117. Id. at 336. 
 118. For an excellent survey and critique of different scholarly assessments of the 
ministerial exception, see generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity 
in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 1265 (2017). 
 119. See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, Implied Consent, and the 
Value of Voluntarism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 542 (2015). 
 120. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2798 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“[C]ourts are not to question where an individual ‘dr[aws] the line’ in defining 
which practices run afoul of her religious beliefs.” (second alteration in original) (quoting 
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that reading the ministerial exception too broadly allows religious 
organizations to engage in pernicious discrimination.121  Amos and Hosanna-
Tabor, when read together, demonstrate the need for a balancing test, and the 
third-party-harm doctrine provides just such a test. 
II.  THE THIRD-PARTY-HARM DOCTRINE AS A 
TOOL TO CHALLENGE EXEMPTIONS FROM STATE REGULATIONS 
The third-party-harm doctrine is both implicit in the strict scrutiny analysis 
developed with regard to judicial exemptions122 and is, or should be, used by 
legislators in the creation of statutory accommodations.123  While the 
institutional question of who is best positioned to evaluate third-party harm 
claims is complex, abandoning the responsibility entirely to the legislators is 
not advisable.124  Rather, there is an important role for courts to intervene 
when statutory accommodations impose significant harms on third parties.125   
As a balancing test, the third-party-harm doctrine counsels that “[r]ather 
than subordinating all religious conduct to laws of general application (or 
vice versa), . . . enforcement of, or exemption from, a law should be 
determined by reference to the effect such decisions have on third parties.”126  
Not all statutory accommodations of religious practices impose burdens on 
third parties, and some burdens are insignificant because they are widely 
distributed.127  The notion of harm to third parties as a limiting factor on 
 
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981))); see also Note, The Ministerial Exception 
to Title VII:  The Case for a Deferential Primary Duties Test, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1787–
89 (2008). 
 121. See, e.g., Robin West, Freedom of the Church and Our Endangered Civil Rights:  
Exiting the Social Contract, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 399, 399–400 
(Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016). 
 122. While the premise that free exercise should be limited when it causes harm to third 
parties runs throughout Sherbert-era jurisprudence, perhaps its most famous articulation 
predates Sherbert.  In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), Justice Robert H. Jackson 
noted that the “limitations which of necessity bound religious freedom . . . begin to operate 
whenever activities begin to affect or collide with liberties of others or of the public,” id. at 
177.  
 123. That legislators will consider the harm to third parties imposed by statutory 
accommodations—and indeed are in a better place to evaluate these harms—is central to much 
scholarly analysis. See MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL:  RELIGION AND THE RULE 
OF LAW 205–10 (2d ed. 2014). 
 124. The extent to which the compelling interest, narrowly tailored approach captures harm 
to third parties is, however, debatable.  For instance, where the state’s compelling interest is 
in helping one party and the narrow tailoring focuses on that party, the possible impact on third 
parties may not be properly taken into account. 
 125. See Nelson Tebbe et al., How Much May Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, 
in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 215, 217 (Elizabeth Sepper et al. eds., 
2017) (proposing that the undue hardship standard used in the context of employment law may 
guide our intuitions about how much harm is too much). 
 126. See Lipson, supra note 73, at 638. 
 127. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women:  Why an 
Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN 
BANC 51, 56–57 (2014).  The authors note that in O Centro, the Court observed that the sect’s 
drug use did not impose a burden on third parties outside the sect, and that in Walz, tax 
exemptions for churches do not impose a significant burden on third parties because the burden 
is distributed across a large and indeterminate class. Id. 
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religious freedom is entrenched in both Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence.  Comporting with the intuitions of both religion 
clauses, then, the doctrine of harm to third parties is uniquely positioned to 
ease the tensions that arise when free exercise and establishment concerns 
abut one another.  Statutory accommodations for religiously affiliated 
daycares raise both free exercise and establishment concerns, and as such the 
third-party-harm doctrine illuminates a new—and potentially more 
successful—strategy for challenging these accommodations.  The following 
Part sketches the core concerns of the doctrine of third-party harms and key 
moments in the emergence of the third-party-harm test. 
A.  The Doctrine of Third-Party Harm:   
Definitions and Developments 
The idea that harm to third parties might function as a limiting factor on 
judicial exemptions and statutory accommodations in the name of religious 
freedom was implicit in many of the Court’s earliest First Amendment 
cases.128  Recently, the doctrine reemerged in Cutter v. Wilkinson,129 with 
the Court observing that “courts must take adequate account of the burdens a 
requested accommodation may impose on non-beneficiaries.”130  In all these 
cases, the doctrine of third-party harm is used, whether implicitly or 
explicitly, as a balancing test:  a judicial exemption or statutory 
accommodation is appropriate if and only if the religious interests at stake 
outweigh the magnitude of the burden and the likelihood of harm occurring.  
While in one line of cases, the Court has expressed profound suspicion of 
balancing tests when it comes to religious freedom,131 in another equally 
prominent line of cases, the Court has employed a balancing test wherein 
harms to third parties are weighed against the benefit to the religious 
group.132  As the third-party-harm test becomes more prominent, scholars 
have grappled with the proper structure and function of the test.  Analyzing 
the third-party-harm test as a balancing test, this Part examines how the third 
 
 128. See, e.g., Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(noting that the state’s interest in the uniform collection of sales tax must be weighed against 
the interests of publishers of religious periodicals to spread the word without the burden of 
sales tax); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972) (observing that the interests of the 
state in a well-educated citizenry must be weighed against the religious interests of the Amish 
parents in keeping their children from school); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–
68 (1879) (noting that the interest of the state in laws that apply uniformly to all citizens must 
be weighed against the interests of the LDS in practicing plural marriage).  
 129. 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
 130. Id. at 720. 
 131. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 n.5 (1990) (“[I]t is horrible to contemplate 
that federal judges will regularly balance against the importance of general laws the 
significance of religious practice.”). 
 132. There is a school of thought, represented by Marci Hamilton, that any harm is too 
much harm, such that exemptions ought to be granted only where religious organizations can 
prove they will do no harm to others. See HAMILTON, supra note 123, at 205–10.  This 
argument has been criticized as reductionistic and implausible in a crowded society where 
harm can be defined capaciously. See Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 1169, 1171 (2007) (reviewing MARCI HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL:  RELIGION AND 
THE RULE OF LAW 205–10 (2005)). 
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party ought to be identified and how the scales in the balancing test ought to 
be calibrated, before finally turning to the invocation of the third-party-harm 
doctrine in Hobby Lobby. 
1.  Third-Party Harms as a Balancing Test 
To assess whether a given action imposes impermissible harms on a third 
party, the Court in Texas Monthly laid out a three-factor balancing test:  first, 
the magnitude of the burden; second, the likelihood of the feared harm 
occurring; and third, the magnitude of the religious interest at stake.133  First, 
as the Court stated in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,134 the burden in 
question must be substantial.  In Thornton, Connecticut’s Sabbath 
observance statute granted a benefit exclusively to religious persons, namely, 
the right not to work on whatever day of the week that person observed the 
Sabbath.135  This religion-only benefit imposed a significant burden on 
employers and non-Sabbatarian employees by requiring them to conform 
their business practices to the particular religious practices of the 
employee.136  The significance of the burden on third parties was central to 
the Court’s rejection of the statute as a violation of the Establishment Clause.  
Determining when a burden is substantial is often challenging, however, and 
does not admit of a bright line analysis.137  While there will be difficult cases 
at the margin, there will also be cases in which the substantiality of the harm, 
such as death or serious injury, is unquestionable. 
Second, scholars argue that courts ought to carefully scrutinize the 
likelihood of the harm occurring.138  Where the risk of that harm is 
vanishingly small, an exemption should not be denied simply because it 
might impose harm on a third party.  For example, in Holt v. Hobbs,139  the 
state cited security concerns related to hiding contraband in denying a 
Muslim inmate’s request to grow a half-inch beard as part of his religious 
observance.140  The Court rejected this argument.  The likelihood that the 
inmate would conceal a dangerous weapon in his half-inch beard was so 
vanishingly small that the burden on third parties was not only not 
substantial, it was nearly nonexistent.141  Courts have extended this analysis 
to situations in which the likelihood of occurrence is less remote and the 
potential harm is very severe.  For example, in custody disputes in which one 
 
 133. For an excellent discussion of the three-factor test, see Christopher C. Lund, Religious 
Exemptions, Third-Party Harms, and the Establishment Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV 1375, 
1376–81 (2016). 
 134. 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
 135. Id. at 706. 
 136. Id. at 709–10.  
 137. See Lund, supra note 133, at 1377 (“[T]he significance of a burden is more of a 
spectral variable than a dichotomous one, and there will be no clear boundary between 
significant and insignificant burdens.”). 
 138. Id. at 1378. 
 139. 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). 
 140. Id. at 861. 
 141. Id. at 864–65.  Holt was decided under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act (RLUIPA) and not the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 86–62. 
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parent is a Jehovah’s Witness (and thus opposed to blood transfusions for 
religious reasons), where the child is healthy and the likelihood that he or she 
would require a transfusion is low, courts have refused to award custody to 
the non-Witness parent solely because of the threat of harm.142  The 
likelihood of a healthy child falling so ill as to require a blood transfusion is, 
courts have concluded, too remote to be relevant.143 
Finally, scholars argue that courts ought to consider the magnitude of the 
religious interests at stake.  Measuring the magnitude of a religious interest 
is, however, quite difficult.  The ministerial exception is the paradigmatic 
instance of courts considering the magnitude of the religious interest at 
stake.144  The ability of religious bodies to choose their leaders free from state 
interference is so central to the full and free functioning of these bodies that 
judicial exemptions or statutory accommodations to allow this functioning 
are appropriate.145  Even where this causes real and significant harm to third 
parties (such as the loss of employment in both Hosanna-Tabor and Amos), 
the significant religious interests at stake in the appointment of ministers 
outweigh the harm to the fired employees.  The extension of the ministerial 
exception in Amos to employees engaged in nonreligious work in secular 
affiliates of a religious organization, however, raises concerns that the once-
narrow exception is now much more capacious.  Beyond the ministerial 
exception, courts have struggled to arrive at a method for assessing the 
magnitude of the religious belief, proffering various criteria, such as the 
centrality of the belief and the sincerity of the belief. 
Courts have long resisted evaluating the truth of a religious claim,146 and 
at times this resistance has been extended to evaluations of the sincerity of a 
religious claim.147  By and large, however, courts have distinguished between 
assessing the truth of a religious claim on the one hand and its centrality or 
sincerity on the other, and they have been willing and able to evaluate the 
latter fairly and effectively.148  Of the three factors for evaluating whether an 
accommodation impermissibly imposes harm on a third party, then, the 
 
 142. See Harrison ex rel. J.D.H. v. Tauheed, 256 P.3d 851, 866–67 (Kan. 2011); Garrett v. 
Garrett, 527 N.W.2d 213, 221 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995). 
 143. See Varnum v. Varnum, 586 A.2d 1107, 1112 (Vt. 1990) (“We are also concerned 
about the use of the finding that defendant would not allow her children to have blood 
transfusions even if medically necessary, in the absence of any evidence that such an 
eventuality is likely and cannot be resolved in ways other than depriving defendant of 
custody.”).   
 144. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 145. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 146. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (“Courts are not arbiters of scriptural 
interpretation.”). 
 147. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (noting that there is an overriding interest in “keeping the courts ‘out of the 
business of evaluating’ . . . the sincerity with which an asserted religious belief is held” 
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))). 
 148. See Ben Adams & Cynthia Barmore, Questioning Sincerity:  The Role of the Courts 
After Hobby Lobby, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 59, 60–62 (2014) (observing that courts have 
evaluated the sincerity of religious claims on questions ranging from conscientious objection, 
to drug use, to bankruptcy proceedings). 
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magnitude of the religious interest at stake appears to be the most challenging 
to apply. 
2.  Identifying the Third Party 
Identifying who, precisely, counts as a third party for purposes of the third-
party-harm test has significant implications for how such claims can be 
litigated.  Determining who, if anyone, has standing to challenge a judicial 
exemption or statutory accommodation can be difficult.149  When identifying 
the harmed third party, two overarching questions emerge.  First, how 
identifiable must the third party be?  Second, ought the harm to “internal” 
third parties be treated differently from the harm to “external” third parties? 
First, here is significant disagreement as to the degree of specificity with 
which courts ought to identify the harmed third party.  There is a line of cases, 
exemplified by Reynolds and Smith, in which the identity of the third party is 
defined quite capaciously, seeming to encompass the entire body politic.150  
That the Court implicitly identified the state as the harmed third party rather 
than, for example, wives or children living in polygamous households, is 
perhaps surprising.151  Likewise, in Yoder, the harms that the Court weighed 
were the harm to the state of having an uneducated citizen and the harm to 
the parents’ free exercise of religion.152  As Justice Douglas notes in his 
dissent in Yoder, however, the Court arguably did not correctly identify the 
third party most directly harmed by the exemption:  the Amish children.153  
Further, Jonathan Lipson has argued that where the harmed party is the state 
as an abstraction, the ability to interfere with the internal affairs of a religious 
organization ought to be strictly curtailed.154 
Second, where the harmed third parties are individuals, rather than the 
state, should it matter whether the harmed party is a member of the same 
religious community?  One might argue that harms imposed on third-party 
insiders, such as members of the religion, ought to be given less weight, 
provided that the insiders have a real ability to exit the offending 
organization, than harms imposed on third parties who are removed from the 
religious organization.155  Even were one to accept the insider versus outsider 
 
 149. For example, secular daycares that have challenged statutory accommodations granted 
to religiously affiliated daycares have had great difficulty establishing standing. See infra Part 
III.B.  
 150. In both cases, the key concern was the damage an exemption would do to the cohesion 
of the body politic were individuals allowed to become laws unto themselves. See Emp’t Div. 
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878). 
 151. By contrast, the invocation of a depersonalized body politic in Smith is perhaps more 
understandable, as it is difficult to imagine who would suffer individualized harm were Native 
Americans granted an accommodation to use peyote in ritual settings. 
 152. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972). 
 153. Id. at 245 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It is the future of the student, not the future of the 
parents, that is imperiled by today’s decision.”). 
 154. See Lipson, supra note 73, at 670 (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727–29 
(1871)).  
 155. See generally Emile Lester, The Right to Reasonable Exit and a Religious Education 
for Moderate Autonomy, 68 REV. POL. 612 (2006) (noting the central importance of freedom 
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dichotomy, determining who qualifies as an insider can be challenging.  For 
example, are children “insiders” for the purposes of analysis if they lack a 
meaningful ability to exit the community?156  How to identify the relevant 
party for the purposes of the third-party-harm test remains unsettled, and the 
ultimate resolution of this question will have a significant effect on how 
questions of standing in cases invoking the test are resolved. 
3.  Calibrating the Scales for the Balancing Test 
Even where scholars agree that harm to third parties ought to be the test 
for determining whether a statutory accommodation or judicial exemption for 
religious practice is legitimate, how to calibrate the test poses additional 
challenges.  Opinions run the gamut from setting the scales evenly to 
allowing religious communities a “thumb on the scale.”  Proponents of 
setting the scales evenly offer both practical and principled reasons for so 
doing.  In his analysis of Yoder, Ira Lupu argues that, despite the language of 
substantial burden and compelling interest, the Court was actually engaged 
in an even-handed balancing of the interests of both parties, factoring in the 
harms for each side at the margin.157  This fact-intensive analysis, where 
there was no presumption either in favor of or opposing an exemption and 
where the benefits and harms of an exemption were carefully weighed, best 
serves the interests of both parties.  Indeed, as Lupu notes, the ability to 
balance benefits and harms accurately is so important that it should be solely 
the province of the legislature, such that judicial exemptions should be 
abandoned in favor of statutory accommodations.158 
Adopting a slightly different approach, Jonathan Lipson advocates for the 
scales to be evenly set when the religious exercise harms third parties but for 
a thumb to be on the scale for religious persons or organizations when it does 
not.159  As such, “[t]he thumb should rest on the scales in favor of religious 
actors in inverse proportion to the presence of third parties.”160  By contrast, 
Michael McConnell would grant religion a thumb on the scale even where 
the practice in question imposes harm on third parties.161  For McConnell, 
religion has a special constitutional status, and as such, while legislatures 
may consider economic and other harms to third parties when considering 
accommodations, they are not required to do so.162  Though there is 
 
of exit, particularly where exemptions may impair a person’s ability to function outside of the 
religious community). 
 156. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.  The same logic also applies to the 
children of Jehovah’s Witnesses who may be too young to effectively exit the church in order 
to receive a life-saving blood transfusion. 
 157. See Lupu, supra note 20, at 50. 
 158. Id. at 101. 
 159. See Lipson, supra note 73, at 671. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 37.  
McConnell does recognize one caveat, namely where the accommodation would impose a 
burden on a third party’s religious liberties. Id. at 23. 
 162. Id. at 38 (“[T]he legislature is [not] required to treat religious conviction as if it had 
no greater weight or dignity under the Constitution than economics or similar interests.”). 
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disagreement in the scholarly community about how to set the balance and 
which kinds of harms count,163 there is broad agreement that a third-party 
harm balancing test is consistent with the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses of the Constitution.164 
B.  The Resurgence of the Third-Party-Harm Test:  
Hobby Lobby 
Though the idea that harm to third parties ought to limit judicial 
exemptions and statutory accommodations has run throughout Free Exercise 
and Establishment Clause jurisprudence, in recent years the third-party harms 
test has enjoyed a new prominence.  The Court’s discussion of harm to third 
parties as a limiting factor on religious accommodations in Hobby Lobby 
points to a new strategy for the parents of children who died or were injured 
in religiously affiliated daycares excepted from state regulations to challenge 
these accommodations.165 
In Hobby Lobby, a for-profit, closely held corporation sought an exemption 
from the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) mandated contraceptive coverage for 
drugs or devices that operate after the moment of conception because 
contraception contravenes the owners’ sincere religious belief that life begins 
at conception.166  Under RFRA, a government action that imposes a 
substantial burden on religious exercise must (1) serve a compelling 
government interest and (2) be the least restrictive means of serving that 
interest.167  In a five-to-four decision, the Court assumed arguendo that the 
government has a compelling interest in ensuring that people have access to 
contraceptive coverage as part of their health insurance but found that the 
mandate failed the second prong, as there are less restrictive ways to achieve 
the same goal.168  Indeed, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
regulations already excepted nonprofit organizations with religious 
objections from the contraceptive mandate.169  The group-health-insurance 
issuer for such organizations must exclude contraceptive coverage from the 
employer’s plan and issue separate contraceptive payments for plan 
participants without imposing the costs on the organization.170  The decision 
had significant implications for religious liberty jurisprudence, chief among 
them weakening the “substantial” in “substantial burden.”171  Though the 
 
 163. See, e.g., Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 127, at 56–57; Lipson, supra note 73, at 
635–50. 
 164. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 133, at 1375; Lupu, supra note 20, at 100–01. 
 165. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 n.37 (2014). 
 166. Id. at 2766. 
 167. Id. at 2759. 
 168. Id. at 2758–59. 
 169. Id. at 2763.  HHS has effectively exempted certain religious organizations from the 
mandate, namely eligible organizations, defined under 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b) (2016) as 
nonprofit organizations that hold themselves out as a religious organization and oppose 
providing some or all contraceptive coverage because of religious objections.  To qualify for 
an accommodation, an organization need only certify that it is a religious organization. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Abner S. Greene, Religious Freedom and (Other) Civil Liberties:  Is There a Middle 
Ground?, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 179–80 (2015) (noting that the majority decision 
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doctrine of third-party harm does not figure prominently in the majority’s 
decision, it appears in a modified form in the Court’s discussion of the 
government’s argument that the plaintiff is seeking an exemption from a legal 
obligation to confer a benefit on a third party.172  Indeed, the assumption that 
the government would provide an alternative mechanism for female 
employees to obtain free contraception and thus to suffer no harm is key to 
the holding.  Though the Court (rightly) rejected HHS’s argument that RFRA 
does not permit the state to burden one party’s free exercise so long as the 
burden confers a benefit on another party,173 it noted that impeding women’s 
receipt of healthcare benefits harms women and is not what Congress 
contemplated.174 
Though the question of harm to third parties was dismissed rather 
cavalierly in the majority decision, Justice Ginsburg raised it forcefully in her 
dissent:  “No tradition, and no prior decision under RFRA, allows a religion-
based exemption when the accommodation would be harmful to others—
here, the very persons the contraceptive coverage requirement was designed 
to protect.”175  The harms imposed on third parties—here, female employees 
of corporations exempted from the ACA mandate—are significant, from 
increased contraceptive costs, to the risk of unplanned pregnancies, to the 
denial of contraceptives used to treat other diseases such as menstrual 
disorders.176  Writing for the majority, Justice Alito acknowledged that the 
denial of contraceptive coverage burdened third parties but concluded that 
HHS, by creating an accommodation for certain nonprofit religious 
organizations whereby the costs for contraceptive coverage would be borne 
not by the organization but by the plan issuer, had already developed a work-
around to alleviate this burden.177 
Indeed, had the Court applied the three-factor third-party-harm test, the 
outcome would likely have been different.  First, the magnitude of the harm 
to third parties is high:  the inability to control one’s reproductive life imposes 
significant burdens on women.  Second, the likelihood of harm is high:  
excluding contraceptive coverage from the employer health plan would have 
an immediate and noticeable effect on women.178  Though the fact of a work-
 
simply deferred to Hobby Lobby’s assertion that the mandate imposed a substantial burden); 
see also Alex J. Luchenitser, A New Era of Inequality?:  Hobby Lobby and Religious 
Exemptions from Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 68 (2015).  
Luchenitser notes that the religious organization need show only that the claims that the 
governmental action imposes a substantial burden reflects its honest conviction. Id. 
 172. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 2782–83. 
 175. Id. at 2801 (Ginsberg J., dissenting). 
 176. For a discussion of the myriad burdens that reduced access to contraceptives imposes 
on women, see Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 127, at 57–59. 
 177. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2763, 2782 (majority opinion).  Critics have challenged 
this assessment, arguing that the majority fails to appreciate the significant practical 
difficulties of achieving the work-around. See Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1492–95 (2015). 
 178. The harm to third parties cannot be effectively alleviated by requiring women to obtain 
contraceptive-only coverage, as the attendant statutory, regulatory, and practical barriers this 
entails create significant hurdles for women seeking contraception.  Contraception-only 
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around to accommodate religious nonprofits may diminish the likelihood of 
harm somewhat, these work-arounds have been challenged repeatedly and 
their continued existence is somewhat precarious.179  Finally, the magnitude 
of the affected belief is also high.  Courts, in recognition of the importance 
of these beliefs to many different religious communities, are particularly 
sensitive to religious views about when life begins.  Thus, though the Hobby 
Lobby majority did not address the question of third party harms in any depth, 
the issue was raised, and with especial force in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.  
Had the third-party-harm balancing test been applied, it is likely that the harm 
imposed on the female employees would outweigh the burden imposed on 
the employer’s religious beliefs.  With this account of the third-party-harm 
doctrine as it intersects with the religion clauses in place, this Note brings the 
doctrine to bear on the difficult question of legislative accommodations for 
religiously affiliated daycares. 
III.  STATUTORY ACCOMMODATIONS FOR RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED 
DAYCARES:  ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE EXERCISE CONCERNS 
As the preceding Parts demonstrate, the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise 
and Establishment Clauses is complex and contradictory.  Some states,180 
perhaps noting the Court’s shifting interpretation of these Clauses and 
seeking to protect religious institutions from state interference, enacted 
statutes excusing religiously affiliated daycares from complying with certain 
state regulations.181  Even after Smith, when the Court adopted a deep 
suspicion of judicial exemptions, the statutes remained in force.182  Indeed, 
where these statutes were challenged, the challenges were wholly 
unsuccessful.183  Part III.A considers several such statutes, while Part III.B 
examines various (failed) efforts to challenge these statutes. 
A.  Statutory Accommodations for Religiously Affiliated Daycares 
All states regulate daycare facilities.  Though the precise scope of the 
regulations, the mechanisms for ensuring compliance, and the penalties for 
failure to comply vary from state to state, there are significant similarities.  
 
policies are not permitted under the ACA, as they are not qualified health plans that offer all 
essential health benefits. See Brief of Health Policy Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 15–20, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (Nos. 14-1418 et al.), 2016 
WL 675863, at *15–20.  In the alternative, requiring women to leave their employer-sponsored 
health plans would likely disrupt the important relationships women have with their healthcare 
providers as they would almost certainly face a different provider network. Id. at 18. 
 179. See Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016) (per curiam).  The Court, down to 
eight members, remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 1561. 
 180. See supra note 3. 
 181. Alabama amended its code in 1981 to exempt religiously affiliated daycares from 
many regulations. See 1981 Ala. Laws 396.  Indiana extended exemptions to religiously 
affiliated daycares in 1993. See 1993 Ind. Acts 106. 
 182. See supra Part I.A.2.a. 
 183. Where the statutes were challenged, courts found either that (1) the exemptions 
satisfied the Lemon test and so were acceptable statutory accommodations; (2) the challengers, 
secular daycares, lacked standing as they failed to show that the exemptions resulted in actual 
economic harm; or (3) both of the preceding. See infra Part III.B. 
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Broadly speaking, states prescribe a rigorous set of regulations for daycare 
facilities that cover a wide range of topics including character and 
qualifications of the caregivers, minimum child-to-caregiver ratios, 
acceptable disciplinary practices, health and safety standards, and record-
keeping requirements.184  The definition of “daycare facility” is quite 
capacious in many states, such that the regulations cover a broad range of 
childcare arrangements, from formal preschools to in-home care.185  A 
number of states have enacted statutes exempting religiously affiliated 
daycares from many of the regulations that govern secular facilities.  The 
scope of these accommodations ranges widely, from near-total exemption 
from state regulation in Alabama186 to more limited exemptions in North 
Carolina, with other states, including Florida and Virginia falling somewhere 
in between.  The accommodations address issues of health and safety, staff 
qualifications and training, and reporting requirements. Considering the 
scope of the statutory accommodations granted to religiously affiliated 
daycares provides valuable insight into the internal logic of the 
accommodations. 
Before turning to a close examination of the statutes regulating daycares 
and the accommodations extended to religiously affiliated daycares, a brief 
note on the complicated history of establishment clauses in state constitutions 
underscores the complex place of religiously affiliated educational 
institutions in state legislative schema.  In response to the influx of Roman 
Catholics to the United States in the mid-nineteenth century—and their 
attendant efforts to establish Roman Catholic schools—a significant number 
of states adopted so-called Blaine amendments into their state 
constitutions.187  Blaine amendments prohibit all financial support of 
religious institutions by the state.188  Though the Blaine amendments are 
 
 184. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-7-7 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 402.305 (2017); IND. CODE § 12-
17.2-6-2 (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.211 (2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-106 (2017); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 63.2-1716 (2017). 
 185. See ALA. CODE § 38-7-8.  The Alabama Administrative Code defines childcare facility 
capaciously, requiring any facility that provides care for one or more children unrelated to the 
provider for more than four hours a day to be licensed whether or not the provider is 
compensated. Id. 
 186. Alabama’s sweeping accommodations have received some scrutiny recently, and there 
is currently a bill before the Alabama House of Representatives that would rescind nearly all 
of the current accommodations and require religiously affiliated daycares to submit to the same 
licensing requirements as secular daycares. See H.R. 548, 2016 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2016).  The 
bill, however, has languished in the state house since it was introduced on April 19, 2016, and 
its prospects for passage are dim at best. See Alabama House Bill 548, LEGISCAN, 
https://legiscan.com/AL/bill/HB548/2016 [https://perma.cc/N8GW-2B8D] (last visited Nov. 
19, 2017). 
 187. Efforts to pass a Blaine amendment at the federal level were very nearly successful, 
with the proposed amendment passing in the House of Representatives and failing to meet the 
required two-thirds majority in the Senate by only four votes. See Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s 
Laws:  State Blaine Amendments and Religious Persecution, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 510 
(2003). 
 188. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (“No revenue of the state or any political subdivision 
or agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of 
any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.”); MO. CONST. 
art I, § 7 (“[N]o money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in 
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limited to financial support, the strong separation between church and state 
that the amendments call for may be read as support for state disengagement 
from religion.189  This reading was dealt a serious blow, however, in Trinity 
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,190 in which the Court held that 
withholding a public benefit from a church simply because it was a church 
was “odious to our Constitution.”191  The impact of this decision on 
arguments that exemption from state regulation amounts to de facto state aid 
for religious bodies has yet to be felt, and the question remains a live one.  
With this caveat, this Note turns to the statutory schema exempting 
religiously affiliated daycares from regulation. 
Though the process by which a daycare facility is recognized as religiously 
affiliated, and so not bound by the full panoply of regulations that apply to 
secular facilities, differs from state to state, in no state is the process 
particularly onerous.  For example, in Alabama, churches seeking 
accommodations for their preschool programs must merely file a notice with 
the Department of Human Resources indicating that they meet the definition 
of a “local church ministry”192 along with a notice of intent to operate with 
the appropriate fire and health departments.193 
The accommodations that states provide can be organized into several 
categories:  first, basic health and safety; second, teacher qualifications and 
ratios; and third, child discipline.  First, although some states require 
religiously affiliated daycares to comply with the same health and safety 
regulations as secular daycares, not all do.194  In Alabama, for instance, in 
which close to half of all daycare facilities are currently excepted from 
regulations, the Department of Human Resources requires only that 
religiously affiliated daycares file notices of intent to operate with the 
appropriate health and fire departments but does not provide a mechanism 
for collecting or overseeing these evaluations.195  Virginia, by contrast, 
requires exempt facilities to file documentation certifying that the facility has 
been inspected by the local health department and fire marshal and is in 
compliance with all applicable health and safety laws and regulations.196  
Likewise, while Florida exempts religiously affiliated daycares from the 
 
aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, minister 
or teacher thereof, as such; and . . . no preference shall be given to nor any discrimination 
made against any church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship.”). 
 189. See generally Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Missouri, American 
Humanist Association, Center for Inquiry, Freedom from Religion Foundation, and People for 
the American Way Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Trinity Lutheran 
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (No. 15-577), 2016 WL 3640468. 
 190. 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017). 
 191. Id. at 2025. 
 192. See ALA. CODE § 38-7-3 (2017) (exempting religiously affiliated daycares whether or 
not they are attached to a religious elementary school). 
 193. Id. 
 194. ARK. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., MINIMUM LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR CHILD CARE 
CENTERS (2015), http://humanservices.arkansas.gov/dccece/licensing_docs/2014%20A1% 
20CCC%20clean%20copy%20final%20filing.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WB2-YPPS]. 
 195. ALA. CODE § 38-7-3. 
 196. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1716(A)(2) (2017). 
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statewide health and safety regulations that govern secular daycares, it 
requires excepted facilities to meet the minimum standards set by the relevant 
local agency.197 
Second, while even those states with the most far-reaching exceptions 
require compliance with basic health and fire regulations, many states grant 
broad exceptions from standards regulating teacher qualifications and staff 
ratios.  For example, in Florida, personnel working in nonexempt facilities 
must meet a host of requirements, from screening for “good moral character” 
to training in child development.198  Personnel in religiously affiliated 
facilities, however, are exempted from all training requirements and must 
merely demonstrate that they meet screening requirements related to past 
criminal activity.199  Similarly, in Virginia, personnel in religiously affiliated 
daycares that choose to be exempt from licensure need not meet any training 
requirements.  They are required only to obtain “a search of the central 
registry . . . on any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect and a 
criminal records check” and to provide a sworn statement disclosing whether 
the applicant has ever been “the subject of a founded complaint of child abuse 
or neglect,” convicted of a crime, or the subject of pending criminal 
charges.200 
Not only is the staff of exempted facilities not held to the same standards 
with regards to training and background, but some states also exempt 
religiously affiliated daycares from minimum staff-to-student ratios.  Of all 
the statutory accommodations, exemption from minimum ratios is perhaps 
the most significant in terms of both differential costs imposed on secular and 
religious facilities and a facility’s ability to adequately supervise and protect 
the children in its care.  In Alabama, exempted facilities are not required to 
meet any minimum staffing requirements, with the caveat that they “make 
available” to parents the adult-to-child ratio.201  In Florida, daycares are 
 
 197. FLA. STAT. § 402.316 (2017).  The penalty for failure to comply with local 
requirements is the loss of exemption from licensure. Id.  The penalties provision that applies 
to nonexempt facilities in Florida does not, however, extend to exempt facilities. See id. 
§ 402.319(1). 
 198. Id. § 402.305(2)(a).  Personnel are required to take a forty-hour course covering topics 
including child safety and development and to demonstrate competency by passing an 
examination. Id.  The course covers important safety information, including how to recognize 
and prevent shaken baby syndrome, prevention of sudden infant death syndrome, and the 
recognition and care of infants and toddlers with developmental disabilities. Id.  Personnel are 
additionally required to take an annual continuing education course, including a course 
specifically devoted to early literacy and language development. Id. 
 199. FLA STAT. § 435.04 (2017) (excluding persons found guilty of a series of offenses such 
as murder, sexual assault, and drug crimes). 
 200. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1724 (2017).  Those convicted of “barrier crimes,” defined at 
§ 19.2-392.02, and including murder, obscenity and sexual abuse, are wholly prevented from 
working at daycare facilities, both licensed and unlicensed. Id. § 63.2-1724. 
 201. ALA. CODE § 38-7-3 (2017) (“The following information shall be available to parents 
or guardian prior to enrolling their children in said church ministry; staff qualifications; pupil-
staff ratio; discipline policies; type of curriculum used in the learning program; the religious 
teachings to be given each child; and the type of lunch program available.”).  Having done 
this, exempt programs are almost wholly relieved of any state oversight.  They are required 
only to inform the department that they are providing this information to the parents and that 
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required to maintain strict maximum child-to-adult ratios, while religiously 
affiliated facilities are wholly exempted from these requirements.202  By 
contrast, in Virginia, religiously affiliated facilities are required to comply 
with maximum adult-to-child ratios, requiring one adult for every four 
children under two, one for every ten children six and younger, and one for 
every twenty-five children over six.203 
Finally, religiously affiliated daycares are routinely granted 
accommodations from state laws governing the discipline of children in 
daycare facilities.  Arkansas requires exempt facilities to comply with state 
standards on corporal punishment unless alternative compliance is granted 
by the Division of Child Care and Early Childhood Education at the 
Department of Human Services.204  Other states, including Alabama, excuse 
exempt facilities from state standards on discipline.205 
B.  Legal Challenges to Statutory Accommodations 
Secular daycares in several states have challenged the statutory 
accommodations extended to religiously affiliated facilities but have been 
unsuccessful at every turn.206  Three common issues arise.  First, courts find 
that requiring religiously affiliated daycares to submit to state regulations 
would result in impermissible entanglement of the state in internal church 
affairs.207  Second, courts reject equal protection challenges, finding that 
secular and religiously affiliated daycares are not similarly situated and that 
the accommodations are not only constitutionally appropriate but also 
possibly constitutionally required.208  Third, the courts routinely find that the 
secular providers lack standing to bring their claims.209 
Concerns about excessive entanglement between the state and religious 
organizations—and attendant Establishment Clause concerns—are at the 
heart of each of the decisions on statutory accommodations for religiously 
 
they are maintaining fire and health inspection reports, immunization records and medical 
history forms. Id. 
 202. FLA. STAT. § 402.305(4).  There must be one childcare professional for every four 
children under the age of one; one professional for every six children between the ages of one 
and two; one professional for every eleven children between the ages of two and three, and so 
on. Id. 
 203. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1716. 
 204. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-78-209(b)(4) (2017). 
 205. ALA. CODE § 38-7-3. 
 206. See, e.g., Forest Hills Early Learning Ctr., Inc. v. Grace Baptist Church, 846 F.2d 260, 
264 (4th Cir. 1988); Kid’s Care, Inc. v. State of Ala. Dep’t of Human Res., No. 01-T-453-N, 
2001 WL 35827965, at *2 (M.D. Ala. June 14, 2001); Forte v. Coler, 725 F. Supp. 488, 491 
(M.D. Fla. 1989). 
 207. Courts recognize that some contacts between church and state, including fire 
inspections and building and zoning regulations, are not only unavoidable but desirable. See 
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305 (1985); Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 603, 614 (1971). 
 208. See Kid’s Care, 2001 WL 35827965, at *3. 
 209. Although courts have found that secular daycares lack standing, in many decisions 
they also, surprisingly, consider the merits of the case. See id. at *2. 
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affiliated daycares.210  In Forest Hills Early Learning Center, Inc. v. Grace 
Baptist Church,211 the Court applied the Lemon test as interpreted by Amos, 
which had been decided while the case was on remand to the district court.212  
Moving quickly over the first, or purpose, prong of the Lemon test to the 
second prong, the Court found that the accommodation not only does not 
promote religion but also that denying the accommodation would effectively 
inhibit religion.213  In its discussion of excessive entanglement, the Court 
relied on the Amos Court’s finding that requiring a religious group to defend 
its beliefs in free exercise litigation before a judge who may be ignorant of 
the group’s religious mission and purpose implicates establishment 
concerns.214  To deny religiously affiliated daycares exemptions from certain 
state regulations would be to require the kind of issue-by-issue free exercise 
litigation that Amos eschews.215  This would both “chill and interfere with 
religious groups, enmeshing judges in intrusive and sometimes futile 
attempts to understand the contours, sincerity and centrality of the religious 
beliefs of others.”216 
In Forte v. Coler,217 in which a secular daycare likewise challenged the 
constitutionality of statutory exemptions for religiously affiliated daycares, 
the court drew directly on the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Forest Hills, 
characterizing it as “highly persuasive.”218  Noting that the accommodation 
satisfies the first and second prongs of the Lemon test, the court then noted 
that not only does the statute not promote the entanglement of church and 
state, it also effects more complete separation of the two than would obtain 
in the absence of the accommodation.219  Further, as in Forest Hills, the 
accommodation eases the burden on the court system by obviating the need 
to litigate each and every free exercise claim that would be brought under the 
state RFRA by a religiously affiliated daycare, thereby avoiding 
entanglement concerns.220 
In addition to challenging the statutory accommodations for entanglement 
concerns, many secular daycares have asserted equal protection claims.  In 
such cases, secular providers’ claims that the accommodation improperly 
discriminates between religious and secular facilities have not been 
successful.  Courts have routinely rejected these equal protection claims, 
 
 210. See id. at *4.  The Court also considered entanglement under the aegis of substantive 
due process, finding that the state’s interest in limiting church-state entanglement and 
respecting free exercise could provide a rational basis for the accommodations, resulting in 
the dismissal of the due process claim. Id. at *5. 
 211. 846 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 212. Id. at 263. 
 213. Id. (“Absent the exemption [for religiously affiliated daycares], some church leaders 
would immediately be forced to violate their convictions against submitting aspects of their 
ministries to state licensing, or face legal action by the state.”). 
 214. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
 215. Forest Hills, 864 F.2d at 263. 
 216. Id. at 264. 
 217. 725 F. Supp. 488 (M.D. Fla. 1989). 
 218. Id. at 490. 
 219. Id. at 491. 
 220. Id. 
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finding that the statutes are motivated by a permissible purpose (namely, to 
avoid excessive entanglement) and that the exemptions are rationally related 
to these permissible ends.  In Kid’s Care, Inc. v. State of Alabama 
Department of Human Resources,221  for instance, the court rejected the 
secular providers’ argument that the accommodations violated the Equal 
Protection Clause because they were “a form of ‘arbitrary and capricious’ 
discrimination among similarly situated daycare providers that lacks any 
rational basis in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”222  Rather, the 
court observed that not only were secular and religious daycares not similarly 
situated as a matter of constitutional law but also that, in passing the statutory 
accommodation, the state acted with a “rational and permissible purpose.”223  
The court then offered several rationales as to why the state would structure 
the accommodation as it does.224  Likewise, in Forte, the court noted that the 
statute was motivated by the permissible purpose of limiting interference 
with free exercise and that the accommodations were rationally related to this 
permissible end.225 
Finally, courts have been unsympathetic to the secular providers’ ability 
even to challenge the accommodation, with many courts finding that the 
secular daycares lack standing to bring their claims.  In Kid’s Care, a group 
of secular daycares asserted that the freedom from onerous regulations gave 
religiously affiliated daycares a competitive advantage and inflicted 
economic harm on secular facilities.226  Specifically, the secular facilities 
contended that, were the accommodations removed, more state subsidies for 
childcare would flow to the secular daycares.227  The court rejected this 
argument, however, concluding that the plaintiffs had offered only highly 
general allegations of harm and that a facial attack on the law fails because 
“it is apparent that the statute is not ‘unconstitutional in all its 
applications.’”228 
 
 221. No. 01-T-453-N, 2001 WL 35827965 (M.D. Ala. June 14, 2001).  
 222. Id. at *3. 
 223. Id.  Indeed, the accommodations were justified by the state’s twin interests in limiting 
church-state entanglement and respecting free exercise. Id. 
 224. Id. at *5 (“For example, the State might want to avoid the higher financial expense 
that would result if it conducted independent evaluations of providers, or, it might find it more 
efficient to monitor the bad-faith conduct of exempted day-care providers through means other 
than its licensing decisions.  Or, the State might have fashioned its certification process so as 
to keep the State out of the business of defining what counts as religion and to limit the possible 
intrusions on the free exercise of religion that could result if religious certification depended 
upon bureaucratic discretion.”). 
 225. Forte, 725 F. Supp. at 491. 
 226. Kid’s Care, 2001 WL 35827965, at *2. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at *9 (quoting Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 953 (11th Cir. 2001)).  Further, the 
Court rejected the Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim, finding that not only did the 
plaintiffs have no colorable allegation of a property interest at issue, but, even were it true that 
more money would flow to secular daycares, this would still not rise to the level of a legitimate 
entitlement. See id. at *4 (“Even if, for the sake of argument, the plaintiffs were entitled to 
operate in a regulatory world without religious exemptions, their hope and expectancy in the 
extra funds that might later be determined to be due them in a post-exemption world still would 
not amount to a present constitutionally cognizable property interest.”). 
2017] RELIGIOUS DAYCARES AND THIRD-PARTY HARM 1427 
The Fourth Circuit, by contrast, found that secular daycares did have 
standing to challenge the accommodations.229  Whereas the Alabama court 
found that religiously affiliated and secular daycares were not similarly 
situated, the Fourth Circuit found that they were.  Citing the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Arkansas Writers’ Project v. Ragland,230 the Fourth Circuit thus 
found that the secular daycares had standing to bring the challenge.231 
The challenges secular daycares have faced with regard to standing are 
instructive and counsel in favor of identifying a litigation strategy in which 
the plaintiffs are not secular daycares.  If the harm-to-third-party doctrine is 
used to challenge these accommodations, the parties who would bring the 
cases would be the parents of the children who were injured or died while in 
the care of understaffed and underregulated religiously affiliated facilities. 
IV.  USING THE DOCTRINE OF THIRD-PARTY HARM TO 
CHALLENGE STATUTORY ACCOMMODATIONS FOR 
RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED DAYCARES 
Given recent developments in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, 
particularly the renewed attention paid to the doctrine of harm to third parties, 
the time is ripe to revisit statutory accommodations granted to religiously 
affiliated daycares.  Where statutory accommodations for religiously 
affiliated daycares have been challenged, the daycares have asserted that 
regulations create excessive entanglement, invoking both free exercise and 
establishment arguments.232  Supporters of accommodations assert that free 
exercise would be limited were religiously affiliated daycares forced to 
comply with, for example, regulatory oversight of disciplinary methods, such 
as corporal punishment.233  Likewise, regulations that dictate staff 
qualifications raise both free exercise and establishment concerns under the 
ministerial exception.234  Underlying both arguments is the question of who 
has standing to challenge these accommodations.  Even were plaintiffs to 
demonstrate standing, they would then need to demonstrate that their 
interests outweigh the burdens on free exercise.  The Texas Monthly test, 
 
 229. Forest Hills Early Learning Ctr., Inc. v. Grace Baptist Church, 846 F.2d 260, 262 (4th 
Cir. 1988).  
 230. 481 U.S. 221 (1987). 
 231. Forest Hills, 846 F.2d at 262.  The court noted that the facts and positions of the case 
were closely analogous to those in Arkansas Writers’ Project, and so the “same principle must 
govern.” Id. (citing Ark. Writers’ Project, 481 U.S. at 221). 
 232. See supra Part III.B. 
 233. Greg J. Matis, Dilemma in Daycare:  The Virtues of Administrative Accommodation, 
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 585 (1990).  States courts differ in their application of the Free Exercise 
Clause to corporal punishment.  In Michigan, for example, although a court upheld regulations 
governing corporal punishment on the ground that the state’s compelling interest in protecting 
children justified the burden, it still found that the regulations violated the religious exercise 
of a religiously affiliated daycare. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Emmanuel Baptist Preschool, 388 
N.W.2d 326, 334 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).  By contrast, a California court found that the state’s 
much more restrictive corporal punishment provision did not burden the religious exercise of 
a religiously affiliated daycare. N. Valley Baptist Church v. McMahon, 696 F. Supp. 518, 520 
(E.D. Cal. 1988). 
 234. See supra Part I.B.3. 
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incorporating a sensitivity to both free exercise concerns in the first prong of 
its second step and establishment concerns in the second prong of its second 
step, may fruitfully be applied.  Taking up first the question of standing and 
then the two steps of the Texas Monthly test, this Note argues that, by using 
the third-party-harm test, the parent of a child injured in a religiously 
affiliated daycare that is exempted from complying with state regulations 
may successfully challenge these statutory accommodations. 
First, where statutory exemptions for religiously affiliated daycares have 
been challenged, the plaintiffs have been owners of secular daycares.235  
Courts have found, across the board, that these plaintiffs failed to show that 
the exemptions resulted in actual economic harm and so lacked standing to 
bring the challenges.236  With courts finding that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing, many of these cases have been dismissed early in the litigation 
process.  Were the parents or guardians of children who suffered injury or 
death in facilities exempt from some or most state regulations to bring a case, 
however, clearing the initial hurdle of standing—demonstrating that they 
suffered a direct, cognizable injury—should be easier.237  Though the parents 
may face difficulty proving causation between the lack of state oversight and 
the child’s injury, were they able to demonstrate standing, they would at least 
advance further in the litigation process. 
Second, the first prong of the Texas Monthly test’s second step asks 
whether exemption from state regulations lifts a free exercise burden that 
would otherwise be imposed by the government.238  Here, most regulations, 
including fire and safety inspections, food preparation, and record keeping, 
do not appear to implicate free exercise concerns.  The concerns raised in 
Forte and Forest Hills thus seem overinclusive.239  Excusing religiously 
affiliated daycares from basic health and safety regulations risks sacrificing 
state interests in the protection of its most vulnerable members on the altar of 
religion. 
Some regulations, however, including those touching on discipline and 
corporal punishment, may implicate free exercise concerns under the Texas 
Monthly test.  Of the states that offer statutory accommodations, many 
explicitly extend the exception to disciplinary procedures.240  Corporal 
 
 235. See generally Kid’s Care, Inc. v. State of Ala. Dep’t of Human Res., No. 01-T-453-N, 
2001 WL 35827965 (M.D. Ala. June 14, 2001); Forte v. Coler, 725 F. Supp. 488 (M.D. Fla. 
1989). 
 236. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 237. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992). 
 238. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 239. See supra Part III.B. 
 240. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-7-3 (2017) (providing that exempt facilities are not bound 
by the disciplinary guidelines that apply to nonexempt facilities but instead must provide 
information on disciplinary procedures to parents); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-78-209(b)(4) (2017) 
(providing that exempt facilities may be granted alternative compliance by the Division of 
Child Care and Early Childhood Education regarding corporal punishment); FLA. STAT. 
§ 402.316 (2017) (providing that regulations addressing discipline do not apply to exempt 
facilities). 
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punishment of children has deep roots in several religious traditions,241 and 
exempting religiously affiliated facilities from regulations concerning 
discipline lifts a free exercise burden that would otherwise be imposed.242 
Regulations governing the qualifications of daycare staff raise separate 
concerns about excessive entanglement.243  If a religiously affiliated daycare 
considers itself an extension of the group’s ministry, then the staff would be 
engaged in ministerial work.244  Though the ministerial exception is typically 
invoked by religious organizations as a defense against a Title VII 
violation,245 it is conceivable that a religiously affiliated daycare may invoke 
the ministerial exception were it forced to comply with state regulations 
concerning staff qualifications.  Indeed, here the ministerial exception is, in 
effect, sanctioned by the state through the statutory accommodation freeing 
the facilities from regulation.246 
The likelihood that an Amos-like ministerial exception would extend to 
staff at religiously affiliated daycares is, however, unclear post-Hosanna-
Tabor.  Deploying the familiar three-step analysis, the magnitude of the harm 
imposed on the third party—job loss—is high; the likelihood of the harm 
occurring is high; and the magnitude of the belief affected is minimal.  Critics 
of Amos might go further, arguing that Amos marked a significant—and 
inappropriate—extension of the ministerial exception from persons engaged 
in preaching and teaching to employees whose jobs have no confessional 
dimension and thus ought not be extended to daycare workers.247  The extent 
to which exceptions from training requirements for staff in religiously 
affiliated daycares is required or desirable is, then, difficult to resolve, with 
 
 241. Alan N. Braverman, Recent Decision, Glaser v. Marietta, 351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 
1971), 12 DUQ. L. REV. 645, 647 n.6 (1974) (noting that the Bible sanctions corporal 
punishment). 
 242. For a discussion of First Amendment arguments for corporal punishment, either by 
parents or, via in loco parentis, by schools, see Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace 
Our Humanity:  Toward a New Legal Regime Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children, 
31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 457–61 (1998). 
 243. Many states with statutory accommodations exempt religiously affiliated daycares 
from complying with regulations concerning staff qualifications. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-7-
3 (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-91(8) (2017). 
 244. The Court extends deep deference to religious organizations on matters of internal 
church organization. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 
U.S. 171, 186 (2012) (“[O]ur opinion in Watson ‘radiates . . . a spirit of freedom for religious 
organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation—in short, power to 
decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as 
those of faith and doctrine.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas 
Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)). 
 245. See Helfand, supra note 119, at 544. 
 246. Following Amos, for example, courts may be deferential to religious organizations’ 
claim to staff their facilities with minimal oversight by the state. See supra notes 114–16 and 
accompanying text. 
 247. The ministerial exception has traditionally been applied narrowly to persons whose 
primary duties are “important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church.” Rayburn v. 
Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985).  Though 
determining which positions qualify under this test may occasionally raise free exercise 
concerns, it is possible to draw distinctions without so doing. See also Hosanna-Tabor, 565 
U.S. at 205.  See generally Note, supra note 120. 
1430 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
the argument that the accommodations are necessary because of the 
ministerial exception not wholly implausible. 
Finally, though some of the exemptions extended to religiously affiliated 
daycares may raise free exercise concerns, post-Texas Monthly the analysis 
would continue.248  Applying the same three-factor test but switching the 
identity of the affected party to a child in the care of a religiously affiliated 
daycare, the same test yields different results.249  First, the magnitude of the 
harm imposed on the third party may be extremely high.  As the Center for 
Investigative Reporting found, children in the care of religiously affiliated 
daycares have suffered serious injury and even death.250  Proving that the 
lack of regulation led to a particular child’s injury or death is necessarily a 
fact-based inquiry.  It is conceivable, however, that a parent-plaintiff could 
demonstrate that the lack of a minimum staff-to-child ratio contributed to a 
child’s wandering off or the lack of safe-sleep training contributed to an 
infant’s crib death.  Second, it is difficult to determine the likelihood of the 
harm occurring.251  While a statistical comparison of injuries sustained in 
regulated daycares and exempt daycares would be the gold standard, in the 
absence of such a study, evaluating likelihood would be challenging.  Third, 
the magnitude of the belief affected may be low.  While religiously affiliated 
daycares would likely argue that state regulations interfere with free exercise 
and promote excessive entanglement, these arguments are weak.  Few of the 
regulations, with the possible exception of some requirements for staff 
qualifications and corporal punishment, touch directly on matters of religious 
doctrine, and state oversight of nonexempt facilities is not particularly 
intrusive.  Under a fact-sensitive balancing test, then, parent-plaintiffs might 
successfully demonstrate that the magnitude of the harm to third parties 
outweighs the magnitude of the belief impacted, particularly where the 
exemption in question was only tenuously related to religious doctrine. 
Even were parent-plaintiffs to successfully demonstrate that the religiously 
affiliated daycare’s free exercise concerns were minimal and that the harm to 
third parties was substantial, one final hurdle would remain:  distinguishing 
the facts from those of Hobby Lobby.  The outcome in Hobby Lobby, brought 
under RFRA, is particularly relevant in those states that have adopted a 
version of RFRA in their state constitutions.252  Though the majority in 
Hobby Lobby recognized that an exemption from the contraception mandate 
burdened third parties, it rejected the application of the mandate because it 
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was not the least restrictive means of serving the government’s compelling 
interest in providing women access to contraception.253  Here, several states 
have adopted alternative registration requirements that require exempted 
facilities to self-report their compliance with a limited number of 
regulations.254  Supporters of statutory accommodations for religiously 
affiliated facilities may argue that, even were parent-plaintiffs to demonstrate 
the exemption imposed harm on third parties, direct state oversight would not 
be the least restrictive means and the alternative self-reporting system would 
be sufficient.  The findings of the Center for Investigative Reporting seem to 
belie this, however, and the forceful dissent in Hobby Lobby may support 
imposing more rigorous oversight where harm to third parties is 
significant.255  Indeed, as the Court recognized in Cutter v. Wilkinson, where 
a statutory accommodation imposes significant harms on third parties, the 
accommodation itself might violate the Establishment Clause.256 
CONCLUSION 
The broad exemptions from regulations, including basic health and safety 
regulations, that some states grant religiously affiliated daycares have 
repeatedly survived challenges brought by secular competitors.257  As more 
light is shone on the dangerous conditions in too many exempt daycares,258 
the need to strike the appropriate balance between the free exercise rights of 
the religiously affiliated facilities and the children in their care is ever more 
pressing.  The recently reinvigorated third-party-harm test, developed most 
fully in Texas Monthly and recognized as imposing some limit on free 
exercise claims in Hobby Lobby, may prove a useful tool for parents whose 
children were harmed in exempt facilities to challenge the statutory 
accommodations that may have contributed to the injury or death of their 
children. 
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